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Was FAIR Fair to U.S. Corn Growers?
  An Analysis of the Payments Offered to Corn Growers Under the 1996 Federal
Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act
In 1996 the institutional setting in which America's feedgrain, wheat, cotton, and rice producers
operate changed dramatically.  Passage of the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act put
our long-standing national policy of protecting farm incomes through supply management and farm program
payments on hold for seven years and replaced it with a series of annual payments decoupled from both
production decisions and commodity prices. Many believe this will usher in a new era for American
agriculture, freeing producers from the need to tailor planting decisions to preserve their eligibility for future
farm program payments, and allowing them to follow price signals and shift production to more profitable
crops.
The new planting flexibility has not come without cost, though. In return for the decoupled payments
and increased flexibility producers have given up some price protection and the safety net has been lowered.
That raises the equity question that forms the basis of this paper: do the payments offered under FAIR fully
reimburse producers for the loss of the price protection provided by the previous target-price, deficiency-
payment (TPDP) program? 
This paper takes no position on whether or not compensation is required.  Its focus is solely on the
question of whether the current Production Flexibility Contract (PFC) payments provide sufficient
compensation for the price protection foregone.  In this analysis PFC payments are simply the amount the
federal government paid to re-purchase the rights to the price  protection granted farmers in previous farm
bills, and the question addressed is simply whether the federal government overpaid or underpaid when
repurchasing for seven years the rights offered under prior law
Deficiency Payments as Derivative Assets
Put options were first used to value price and loan guarantee programs by Merton.  Witt and Reid,2
Turvey et al, Marcus and Modest, Gardner, Irwin et al, Kang and Brorson, and Tirupattur et al have all noted
that the U.S. farm program between 1982 and 1996 could be thought of as a perpetual federal grant to
producers of two put options on each year's crop. In these models, one put gave producers the right to dispose
of their entire crop at the loan rate, no matter how low the commodity s market price. The second put option
covered only a portion of the crop, but could be exercised at the target price, a significantly higher price. 
Those puts, however, were not always free. In many years price protection was available only to
producers who agreed to comply with an Acreage Reduction Program (ARP) that required them to idle a
fixed percentage of their land. The net income foregone when land was $set aside# can be thought of as the
producer s cost for TPDP price protection. 
One additional characteristic of the TPDP program is essential for our purposes.  Each producer was
required to elect annually whether or not to sign up for the price protection. Although it is relatively
unimportant when valuing the program in the first year, the option to choose whether to participate converts
the TPDP program from a simple option to a compound option for future years.
1  In effect, the TPDP
program granted producers a call on a put at a pre-set price, not simply a put as is typically  modeled.  What
FAIR replaced was a portfolio of seven options--one regular put and six additional calls on puts, each with a
different expiration date. In this paper the value of that portfolio of compound and regular options is
estimated and compared to the value of the price protection offered under FAIR.
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In the options literature, compound options are also referred to as split-fee options because the user has to pay
two fees to execute a transaction on the underlying security.  The first fee is for the front-end option that locks in the fee
for the back-end option.  When considering the TPDP program, the fee for the back end option can be thought of as the
expected net income foregone by compliance with the ARP provisions. Since this compound option is given to the
producer the program s value is equal to the first fee.3
The Model   
More formally, we begin by assuming the production technology is linear, and noting that under the
TPDP program producers could choose whether to participate in the program or to accept the market
outcome.  Profit-maximizing producers in any year decide whether or not to enroll in the TPDP program
based on their assessment of the relative payoffs $1 and $2 , their profits if enrolled or not enrolled in the
program, respectively.
(1) $1 = p *P (1 - qs)- c *P (1 - qs) - FC + (1 - qs -qf ) * [Max(0, T - p) - Max(0, L - p)]  +
P (1 - qs) * Max(0, L - p)
and
(2) $2 =   P(p - c) - FC
Under the FAIR, net profit will be 
(3) $3   =  P(p - c) - FC +P * Max ( 0, L - p) + G
where
p   =  Market price of corn
c   = Production cost
P    = Ratio of expected yield to historical yield
FC =  Fixed costs
qs   =  Percentage of production foregone due to ARP requirements
qf   = Percentage of historic yield attributable to flex acres and therefore ineligible
for deficiency payments
L  =  Loan rate
T  =  Target price
G  =  Production flexibility payment per bushel of historic yield
The conditions under which corn growers would be better off under FAIR than under TPDP with the4
option of participating or not participating in the program can be found by examining the two net income
streams, equations (1) and (3).   Recognizing that the Max ( . ) expressions  are portfolios of puts with strike
prices of T or L, equation (1) can be further simplified to
(1') $1 = p *P (1 - qs)- c *P (1 - qs) - FC + (1 - qs -qf ) Puts @ T +
{P *(1 - qs)  +  ( P -1) *(1 - qs -qf )}Puts @ L
and equation (3) to
(3') $3   =  P(p - c) - FC +  P Puts @ L+ G
Subtracting (2), the returns under a free market alternative, from (1') and (3') yields expressions giving the
value of TPDP and FAIR in any particular year:
(4) TPDP value =   (1 - qs -qf ) Puts @ T + {P *(1 - qs)  +  ( P -1) *(1 - qs -qf )}Puts @ L -  
P (p-c)qs    and
(5) FAIR value = G +P  Puts @ L   
Producers are expected to be indifferent between FAIR and TPDP when the PFC payment plus the
value of the loan protection on the entire crop is equal to the value of a put at the target price on the adjusted
yield plus the value of a put at the loan rate on the remaining production, less the net return foregone due to
ARP requirements.
When this model is extended to seven years and producers are allowed to elect annually whether or
not to participate in the program, the right hand side of (5) in years t+1 through t+n  must be treated as a
portfolio of n compound options, or a series of calls on puts at the target price, where the cost (p0) of each
future put is set at  P (p-c)qs.
2  The payment necessary for producers to be indifferent between giving up the
right to participate in the TPDP program for several years and receiving the FAIR benefits is then the sum of
the  amounts required as compensation for giving up the options to purchase a put at the target price at price
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The option covering the first year of production is not compound because the front end option (the call portion
of the call of a put) does not exist. Thus for the first year of production the put is valued as a simple European option.5
po for each year that privilege is foregone.  This means that the right hand side of (4) can be written as
(4.a) b Put @ T +d Puts @ Lt +
call{(b Put @ T +d Puts @ L)}|p0} t+1 +
call{(b Put @ T + d Puts @ L)}|p0}t+n
where  b =  (1 - qs -qf )
d  = P *(1 - qs)  +  ( P -1) *(1 - qs -qf )
and
(6)  call{(b Puts @ T +d Puts @ L)|p0}t+I
 is the value of a call on a portfolio of b puts on one bushel of historical yield at the target price in year t+I
and d puts on one bushel of historical yield at the loan rate in year t+I for a price of p0. 
The value of FAIR can easily be extended to incorporate PFC payments spread over several years by
treating G as the discounted present value of an expected stream of PFC payments and including the value of
n years of loan protection.  The value of the price protection offered under FAIR by the loan program is
simply the value of a portfolio of nP ordinary puts at the loan rate with one nth  maturing each year. The loans
provided by FAIR are not compound options because there is no front-end fee for obtaining the loan
protection, nor is there any opportunity, or reason, to elect not to participate in any year.
3
Valuing the Options
The value of the portfolio of put options at the loan rate guaranteed under FAIR can be determined
using the well known Black-Sholes option pricing  We choose to characterize this option as a European put,
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Obviously, in all years, if qs = 0 the cost of purchasing the put option is zero and the value of the compound
option is equal to the value of a simple option with the same strike price and maturity.6
exercisable only on the expiration date.
4
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For simplicity the expiration date for the puts representing the deficiency payment and the puts representing
non recourse loans are set at the end of the period during which the average market price is determined, or 19 months
after sign up. 
Geske was the first to derive an explicit formula for a compound option, a call on a call.  Rubinstein
extended Geske s model to include calls on puts and puts on calls.  However, the Geske-Rubinstein approach
applies only to a single option, not a pair of options as is shown in (6), and we are aware of no solution to the
problem of pricing a compound option on a pair of correlated options.  In this paper we simplify the problem
by assuming that the back-end cost of the target price put option was reduced by the value of the cash value
of the d puts at the loan rate received when signing up for the program. 
The Geske-Rubinstein approach requires that the underlying process (on the price of corn) follow a
log-normal random walk.  In the present problem, the market-year price as calculated by the USDA is the
underlying process--it is used to determine both whether producers receive a deficiency payment and the size
of that payment.  The variance-ratio test for a random walk (Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay, p. 52) was
performed on the annual market-year price series, and the null hypothesis of a random walk could not be
rejected.  Given that our model depends upon annual prices seven years into the future, this test result ensures
that the Geske-Rubinstein approach can be used to value the TPDP program for seven years.  If  one were
interested only in the current year s program benefits, additional information may be available from recent
intrayear price variation, in which case the value of the TPDP program for the coming year could be estimated
using an Asian option model.  The result of the random-walk test on the annual series indicates that the Asian7
approach is not necessary when valuing the multi-year program.
Typically when an option is to be  valued, e.g. by the Black-Scholes method, four of the five
necessary parameters--the interest rate, the underlying price, the strike price, and the exercise date--are known
with certainty. Volatility, the remaining parameter, must be estimated.  The volatility of cash corn prices
varies depending on the period used to construct the estimate.  In the calculations to follow, three values of
volatility were used: .20, .225, and .25.
In our problem, the initial price is also unknown because the date on which the actual $trade# of the
TPDP portfolio for the FAIR portfolio was made is unknown.  The idea of a decoupling program was first
suggested in August of 1995.  The first rough outline of a payment schedule was offered in September 1995. 
The House version of the bill was approved in committee at the end of January 1996, approved by the House
by late February, and agreed to in conference committee on March 21, 1996 (Orden, Roe, and Paarlberg). 
Any date within that period could be claimed as the effective date for valuing the 1990 program.  To indicate
the potential range in the value of the TPDP program, we calculated the value of the portfolio of compound
options for initial prices of $2.60, $2.75, $2.90, and $3.05 per bushel.
Similarly qs , the effective percentage reduction in yield due to any ARP, is unknown.  Here we offer
three  alternative levels: 0, .05 and .10.  For simplicity we have assumed that a 5 percent ARP translates into
a 5 percent decline in production.  The value of P was calculated as the five-year average of the ratio of actual
yield to historical yield.  This value is 1.12.  We set the value of qf at .15, consistent with the requirements of
the 1990 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act.
Results
Estimates of the fair market price for the portfolio of put options offered by the TPDP program and
replaced by FAIR=s fixed schedule of PFC payments and loan provisions are displayed in table 1.  Values for
alternative combinations of initial prices, ARP requirements and volatilities are provided to indicate the
sensitivity of the estimates to assumed values for those parameters.  As would be expected, the value of the8
TPDP program is greater for lower corn price and higher levels of volatility. Increases in the ARP reduce the
number of puts at the target price and increase the back-end cost of the option, so the value of the TPDP
program declines with an increase in expected ARP.
   Estimates of the total value of the FAIR program for its entire seven-year period of authorization are
provided in table 2.   FAIR=s value increases slightly with the volatility of the corn price since the value of
the loan put portfolio increases, but the increase is small.  The present value of PFC payments is by far the
largest portion of the value of FAIR.
Estimates of the net gains per bushel of historical yield from shifting from TPDP to FAIR are shown
in table 3, and estimates of the aggregate net gain to corn growers enrolled in FAIR are shown in table 4.  The
amounts in table 4 can be compared against the $17.1 billion authorized for PFC payments to corn producers,
to determine the extent to which payments under FAIR exceeded the market value of the price protection
given up. In all instances the value of FAIR exceeds the market value of the rights to the price protection
offered corn growers under the TPDP program, even assuming no benefit from the additional planting
flexibility available under FAIR.
Indeed, even when the underlying volatility is set at .25 and expected future ARP=s at zero, corn
growers gained if the cash corn price at the time the trade of TPDP for FAIR was made exceeded  $2.32 per
bushel, a price well below those observed during farm bill negotiations in 1995.  Alternatively, if an initial
price of $2.75 and zero expected future ARP=s are assumed,  the switch to FAIR would reduce expected farm
income only if the underlying volatility in the absence of the supply management program associated with
TPDP exceed .358.  Any increases  in farm income due to the additional planting flexibility would only add to
the gains under FAIR.
These estimates indicate that corn growers in aggregate will receive somewhere between $2.9 billion and
$12.7  billion over the seven year life of the FAIR program beyond the market value of the price protection given
up when the TPDP program was replaced.  Using what we consider to be the parameters most likely to reflect9
the values at the time agreement on FAIR=s payment schedule was reached--a current price of $2.75, expected
effective ARP 5 percent, and expected future volatility of .25--our best estimate is that corn growers were
overpaid by about $8.4 billion (97 percent) for shifting to a decoupled system.
Although the payments provided to corn growers under FAIR appear to be excessive given the range of
prices in existence at the time program changes were under discussion, USDA (1996) has noted that the future
payment stream under FAIR is actually exceeded by the amount paid to farmers under the TPDP program from
1989 to 1995. Those amounts though, overstate the benefit of the TPDP program to farmers because they do not
take into account the implicit costs of the ARP=s on producers who chose to participate in the program.  The
seven-year total also includes the substantial payments made in 1993 when flooding and a cold, wet growing
season in the upper Mississippi region caused extensive use of 0-92 provisions. 
Under current law the FAIR program is to be evaluated in 2002 and either extended or replaced by
provisions of the 1949 Agricultural Act, generally considered to be more generous to farm operators than the
TPDP program.  FAIR does not automatically eliminate any farm program payments after 2002.  These
estimates indicate that it is likely that PFC payments to corn growers in 2003 and beyond could be reduced
substantially without reducing the level of implicit price protection below that offered by the TPDP program.
 While the actual level of payments required to hold producers harmless for the years 2003 and beyond will
depend once again on the price of corn at the time the deal is made, there appears to be ample opportunity to
further reduce agricultural program payments to corn growers after 2002. 
It is, however, important to note that these findings apply only to payments to corn growers and
cannot be generalized to the PFC payments for other program commodities.  The appropriate level of PFC
payments to producers of wheat, cotton, rice, and other feedgrains will depend on the cash prices and the
volatility of those prices, as well as the former target price and loan rate, for each commodity.  There is no
necessary relationship between the amount of overpayment to corn growers and whether producers of other
commodities were overpaid or underpaid by FAIR.11
Table 1: Estimated  value of price protection for corn growers offered by the  TPDP program for the period 1996-2002
(dollars per bushel of historical yield).
  ARP = 0
Price of Corn sigma = .2 sigma = .225 sigma = .25
$2.60 1.203 1.478 1.763 
$2.75 0.982 1.245 1.520
$2.90 0.802 1.049 1.312
$3.05 0.654 0.884 1.134
ARP = .05
$2.60 0.777 1.001 1.235
$2.75 0.568 0.774 0.994
$2.90 0.402 0.588 0.792
$3.05 0.299 0.442 0.623
  ARP = .10
$2.60 0.472 0.656 0.854
$2.75 0.325 0.463 0.628
$2.90 0.232 0.349 0.484
$3.05 0.166 0.263 0.37912
Table 2: Estimates of the value of FAIR for the period 1996-2002 (dollars per bushel of historical yield).
Price of Corn sigma = .2 sigma = .225 sigma = .25
$2.60 1.839 1.927 2.112
$2.75 1.787 1.865 2.027
$2.90 1.749 1.817 1.958
$3.05 1.720 1.779 1.90213
Table 3: Net gain from FAIR program for the period 1996-2002 (dollars per bushel of historical yield).
  ARP = 0
Corn price/bu.  Sigma = .2 Sigma = .225 sigma = .25
$2.60 0.636   0.483 0.349 
$2.75 0.805 0.650 0.506
$2.90 0.947 0.792 0.646
$3.05 1.065 0.914 0.768
ARP = .05
$2.60 1.062 0.961 0.877
$2.75 1.220 1.121 1.033
$2.90 1.346 1.253 1.166
$3.05 1.420 1.361 1.279
  ARP = .10
$2.60 1.368 1.305 1.258
$2.75 1.462 1.432 1.399
$2.90 1.517 1.492 1.474
$3.05 1.554 1.536 1.52314
Table 4: Estimated over payment to corn growers under the FAIR program  for the period 1996-2002 ($ billions)..
  ARP = 0
corn price $/bu. sigma = .20 sigma = .225 sigma = .25
$2.60 5.2 4.0 2.9
$2.75 6.6 5.3 4.1
$2.90 7.7 6.5 5.3
$3.05 8.7 7.5 6.3
ARP = .05
$2.60 8.7 7.9 7.2
$2.75 10.0 9.2 8.4
$2.90 11.0 10.2 9.5
$3.05 11.6 11.1  10.5
  ARP = .10
$2.60 11.2 10.7 10.3
$2.75 12.0 11.8 11.4
$2.90 12.4 12.2 12.1
$3.05 12.7 12.6  12.515
REFERENCES
Black, Fisher and Myron Scholes, ``The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities,''  Journal of Political
Economy, 81 (1973), 637--659.
Campbell, John Y, Andrew W. Lo, and A. Craig MacKinlay, The Econometrics of Financial Markets,
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).
Cox, John C. and Mark Rubinstein,  Options Markets, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1985).
Geske, Robert, $The Valuation of Compound Options,#  Journal of Financial Economics, 7 (1979), 63-81.
Gardner, Bruce L., ``Commodity Options for Agriculture,''  American Journal of Agricultural Economics,
59 (1977), 986--992.
Irwin, Scott H., Anne E. Peck, Otto C. Doering III, and B. Wade Brorsen, ``A Simulation Analysis of
Commodity Options as a Policy Alternative,'' in  Options, Futures, and Agricultural Commodity
Programs: Symposium Proceedings, (Washington, DC: USDA, 1988).
Kang, Taehoon and B. Wade Brorsen, ``Valuing Target Price Support Programs with Average Option
Pricing,''  American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 77 (1995), 106--118.
Lo, Andrew W. and A. Craig MacKinlay, ``Stock Market Prices Do Not Follow Random Walks: Evidence
from a Simple Specification Test,''  Review of Financial Studies, 1 (1988), 41--66.
Marcus, Alan J. and David M. Modest, ``The Valuation of a Random Number of Put Options: An
Application to Agricultural Price Supports,''  Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 21
(1986), 73--86.
Merton, Robert C. $An Analytical Derivation of the Cost of Deposit Insurance and Loan Guarantees.#
Journal of Banking and Finance, (June, 1977):3-11.
Orden, David, Robert Paarlberg, and Terry Roe, ``What Is Happening to U.S.  Farm Policy: A Chronology
and Analysis of the 1995-96 Farm Bill Debate,'' Working paper \#94-4, International Agricultural
Trade Research Consortium, October, 1996.16
Rubinstein, Mark, $Double Trouble# Risk, (Dec.,1991-Jan., 1992).
Tirupattur, Viswanath, Robert J. Hauser, and Phelim P.. Boyle. $Theory and Measurement of Exotic Options
in U. S. Agricultural Support Programs,# American Journal of Agricultural Economics., 79(Nov.,
1997): 1127-1139.
Turvey, Calum, B. Wade Brorsen, and Timothy Baker, ``A Contingent Claim Pricing Model for Valuing
Non-Recourse Loan Program and Target Prices,'' mimeo, 1987.
U.S. Dept. of Agriculture. Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Briefing Book, (April,
1996):29 pp.
Witt, C.A. and D.W. Reid, ``U.S. Farm Price Support Programs Analyzed as Put Options,'' selected paper
presented at the AAEA annual meetings, July 1987.